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1 Introduction 
The value-added tax (VAT) has been adopted in more than 130 countries over the 
last half-century. In particular, all OECD countries with the exception of the Unit-
ed States have introduced VAT. Proponents of VAT claim that it is a particularly 
effective tax that reduces the welfare costs of raising revenue. However, the tax 
should be raised such that it does not lead to significant distortions in competition 
(Keen and Lockwood 2006). Unfortunately, this is not always the case. 
According to Aujean et al. (1999), distortions under VAT arise mainly 
from exemptions for specified services and sectors. As Cnossen (2003) argues, the 
rationale for most exemptions lies in the history of their adoption and not in “their 
underlying economic or administrative logic”. For instance, countries that have 
adopted VAT only recently (e.g., Australia, Canada or New Zealand) follow “best 
practices” by taxing most of the services that are exempt in countries with a long 
history of VAT (e.g., member states of the European Union).  
The postal sector is a good example of such a distortion because most 
member states of the European Union (EU) exempt universal postal services pro-
vided by the incumbent operator from VAT on the grounds that they are the “pub-
lic postal service.” At the same time, competing postal service providers must 
charge VAT at the standard rate. Recently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
essentially confirmed this interpretation of the current VAT Directive.1 According 
to the ECJ, universal service tariffs are VAT exempt unless prices are individually 
negotiated with customers. The decision of the ECJ is binding on all member 
states. The postal sector is therefore a good candidate to illustrate comprehensive-
ly the competitive effects of VAT regimes.  
Our paper focuses on the competitive and welfare effects of different VAT 
regimes in sectors with asymmetric VAT exemptions. Where such exemptions 
exist, the competitive effects are ambiguous a priori. While an exempt firm cannot 
reclaim VAT paid on inputs (which is relevant for non-labor inputs only) and 
therefore faces higher costs, ceteris paribus, an important fraction of the custom-
ers of non-exempt firms will not be able to deduct VAT themselves. Therefore, 
the exempt firm has a cost disadvantage on the one hand and a price advantage on 
the other. The net effect will depend on the fraction of non-labor inputs relative to 
the fraction of non-rated customers. 

1 Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the EU 
member states relating to turnover taxes. 
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To analyze the effects of different VAT scenarios, we develop an analyti-
cal model that is applicable to any sector characterized by asymmetric VAT ex-
emptions of services and activities or differentiated tax rates. In a second step, we 
calibrate the model for a specific sector: the postal market. This approach enables 
us to quantify the competitive and welfare effects of the selected tax regimes. The 
various scenarios differ regarding the firms’ fraction of labor input and their rat-
ing status. We also take into account the fraction of non-rated customers that can-
not deduct VAT themselves. Thus, our paper provides a well-founded basis for 
assessing the main competitive impact of VAT policies while showing the conse-
quences on overall welfare. Finally, we assess the policy trade-off between a level 
playing field, consumer surplus and government tax revenue. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the re-
lated literature. Section 3 introduces the model framework and presents the ana-
lytical results. Section 4 describes the calibration of the model for the postal sec-
tor. Section 5 reports the simulation results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the 
main findings and concludes our study.  
2 Literature Review 
Before proceeding with the model, we present a short literature review. Cnossen 
(1998) examines various VAT structures and argues that the application of VAT 
on public-sector bodies has the advantage of confronting policymakers more di-
rectly with the full cost of public intervention. Competitive conditions are distort-
ed if the government’s services bear a lower tax or no tax while competing pri-
vate-sector services are taxed in full. He concedes, however, that the prices of 
government services are often regulated or subsidized, which makes the levy of 
VAT little more than a bookkeeping exercise, as the effect of the VAT can be 
exactly replicated by the exemption. Keen and Lockwood (2006) use panel data 
for the OECD and empirically test whether VAT is a “money machine.” They 
find that countries with VAT raise more revenue than those without. However, the 
effect may not be large. Keen (2007) examines in detail the criticisms that VAT 
faces today. Giesecke and Tran (2010) analyze the VAT characteristics of multi-
production, legislated differences in exemption status, and industry-specific dif-
ferences in the refundability of VAT paid on inputs to production and investment 
in a general equilibrium framework. Finally, PWC (2007) discuss various forms 
of market distortions resulting from VAT exemptions for financial and insurance 
services.  
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In the postal sector, VAT exemptions have been addressed in recent years. 
Dieke and Elixmann (2005) quantify the effects of such exemptions for postal 
operators on government tax revenue. De Donder et al. (2009) focus on the pric-
ing and welfare implications of changing a postal operator’s VAT status. Crew et 
al. (2009) discuss the importance of VAT exemptions in the framework of the 
prospective study by PwC (2006). Dietl et al. (2011) base their study on our 
framework and utilize the results to derive further insights and implications for 
the postal market. Contrary to our general setting that is applicable to any sector 
characterized by asymmetric VAT exemptions of services and activities or differ-
entiated tax rates, Dietl et al. (2011) specifically tailor their analysis to relevant 
policy issues in the postal industry resulting from the distortion created through 
the VAT exemption of the incumbent postal operator. 
Relative to the work of De Donder et al. (2009), who assume that entrants 
act as a competitive fringe, we model profits of both the incumbent and new mar-
ket entrants. This allows us to provide a more comprehensive treatment of the 
competitive effects of VAT policies. We also provide a relevant sensitivity analy-
sis with regards to the fraction of labor inputs and the fraction of non-rated cus-
tomers. We show that the results are very sensitive to the operators’ labor policies. 
Consequently, VAT exemptions have a different impact in countries with differ-
ent labor regulations. Secondly, the sensitivity analysis highlights that the compet-
itive effects will vary strongly between different customer segments. Therefore, 
there is a second important regulatory link between VAT exemptions and uniform 
pricing constraints. The comprehensive treatment of competition and welfare ena-
bles us to provide guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between con-
sumer surplus, government tax revenue, and a level playing field markets with 
VAT exemptions. 
3 The Analytical Model 
3.1 Notation and Assumptions 
Two firms (operators), denoted by I and E, offer differentiated products or ser-
vices in the same market.2 The before-tax price of firm { , }i E I∈  is given by pi , 
whereas (1+ ti )pi  denotes the after-tax price of firm i, with ti ∈ 0,1[ ]  being the 
VAT rate of firm i. Moreover, each firm pays VAT given by [0,1]t ∈  on non-

2 The firms are denoted by I and E because we calibrate the model with market data from a select-
ed sector (postal market) in Section 4. As mentioned, in postal markets, the (historical) incumbent 
operator I is usually VAT exempt, whereas the entrant operator E is VAT rated. 
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labor inputs. Depending on their VAT status, firms are able to deduct the input 
VAT from their output VAT billed to their customers.  
Following De Donder et al. (2001), we define the total utility of a repre-
sentative customer quasi-linear as3 
u (x I ,x E ) = m +α I x I −
β
2
x I( )2 +α E x E − β2 x E( )
2
− εβx I x E ,                     (1) 
where α I ,α E ,β > 0  and (0,1)ε ∈ . The parameter m>0 characterizes the amount 
of money spent on other goods; x I  and x E  represent the demands faced by firms 
I and E, respectively. The last term in Equation (1) reflects the fact that the prod-
ucts or services offered by the two firms are differentiated products or services. A 
smaller parameter ε  indicates a higher degree of differentiation. The parameters 
α I and α E  determine the market shares of firms I and E, respectively, where-
as β determines the slope of the demand functions. In our model, there are two 
types of customers: VAT rated and VAT exempt customers. For simplicity, we 
aggregate these to one representative customer. Her/his budget constraint is given 
by  
y = m + xI γ pI (1+ tI ) + (1− γ ) pI⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + xE γ pE (1+ tE ) + (1− γ ) pE⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,             (2) 
where [0,1]γ ∈  denotes the fraction of exempt, “non-rated” customers and 
(1−γ )  is the proportion of customers that are rated.4 The latter type of customers 
can reclaim the VAT they paid on their products because these products are an 
input in their own production processes (e.g., most companies and businesses). 
Reclaiming VAT is not possible for exempt customers (e.g., banks, insurances 
and private customers). Therefore, for rated customers, the before-tax price pi  is 
relevant, whereas for exempt customers, the after-tax price (1+ ti )pi  from firm i is 
relevant. The model specification presumes that the fraction of non-exempt letters 
is the same for both firms.  
From Equations (1) and (2), we determine the demand faced by firm i as 
follows. 

3 Similar to and as justified by De Donder et al. (2001), we treat firms and households in the same 
manner (see also De Donder et al. 2002). For notational simplicity, we then utilize the term “utility 
function” even when it relates to firms. Moreover, the quasi-linearity of the utility specification 
enables us to compute monetary welfare measures. 
4 More precisely, γ represents the fraction of demand from its VAT exempt business (e.g., bank-
ing), while (1−γ ) represents ordinary commercial business activities that are rated.  
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Lemma 1 
The linear demand function for the product or service of firm i yields 
xi =
1
β(1− ε2 )
⎡α i − εα j − pi (1+ γ ti ) + ε p j (1+ γ t j )⎣ ⎤⎦ ,                                    (3) 
with , { , }i j E I∈  and i j≠ . 
Proof: See Appendix A1. 
It should be noted that the slopes of the linear demand functions are equal 
for both firms. We further see that the demand of firm i decreases in its own price 
ip  but increases in the price jp  of the other firm j. Demand is also positively re-
lated to a higher degree of product differentiation (a smaller ε ); that is, 
∂x i / ∂ε < 0 . 
If firm i  is VAT exempt (i.e., t i = 0 ), it does not charge VAT to its cus-
tomers, but it does charge VAT to its customers if it is rated (i.e., 0it > ). The ef-
fect of different VAT regimes ,i jt t  on ix , that is 
dx i / dt i = ∂x i / ∂t i + (∂x i / ∂pi  ∂pi / ∂t i )i + (∂x i / ∂p j  ∂p j / ∂t i ) ,   
will depend on the second-order effects of a change in the tax rate it . However, 
these second-order effects are ambiguous, as we will see below.  
On the cost side, firm i is assumed to face three types of costs: (i) fixed 
costs iF , (ii) constant marginal upstream costs ui  (e.g., collection and sorting in 
the postal sector), and (iii) constant marginal downstream costs di  (e.g., mail de-
livery in the postal sector). The fraction of the fixed costs that is non-labor is de-
noted by (0,1)Fiμ ∈ , whereas μ i ∈(0,1)  stands for the fraction of marginal up-
stream and downstream costs that are non-labor costs. It should be noted that firm 
i has to pay VAT, given by t, on the fraction of non-labor costs derived from fixed 
costs, upstream and downstream costs independent of its VAT status. 
We thus specify total costs faced by firm (operator) { , }i E I∈  as 
Ci = 1+ μ i
F (t − ti )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Fi + 1+ μ i (t − ti )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦(ui + di ) ⋅ xi ,                                      (4) 
with t ≥ t i  and demand ix  given by Equation (3). For notational simplicity, we 
denote the sum i iu d+ of marginal upstream and downstream costs with ci  in the 
subsequent analysis: that is, ci = u i + d i .  
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The cost function shows that the VAT status crucially determines the costs 
faced by firm i. For example, if firm i is VAT rated with t i = t , it can reclaim the 
VAT it has paid on inputs such that ri i i iC F c x= + . Conversely, if firm i is non-
rated, that is, VAT exempt with t i = 0 , it cannot reclaim the VAT it has paid on 
inputs such that  Ci
nr
= (1+ μ i
Ft)Fi + (1+ μ it)cixi .  
The (net of tax) profit of firm (operator) i  thus amounts to 
π i = pixi − 1+ μ i (t − ti )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ci ⋅ xi − 1+ μ iF (t − ti )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Fi
=
pi − 1+ μ i (t − ti )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ci
β(1− ε2 )
⎡α i − εα j − pi (1+ γ ti ) + ε p j (1+ γ t j )⎣ ⎤⎦ − 1+ μ iF (t − ti )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Fi ,
with , { , }i j E I∈  and i j≠ . 
The timing is as follows: First, the regulator sets the VAT regime, i.e., it 
decides whether one firm is VAT exempt and the other is rated (Scenario A) or 
whether both firms are rated (Scenario B). Given the VAT regime, the firms sim-
ultaneously maximize their profits and set prices p*i,  i∈{I,E}  correspondingly. 
Then, the customers decide how much to buy at the given price, yielding demands 
x*i,  i∈{I,E}  for the product or service of firm i. Finally, profits are realized.
3.2 Optimality Conditions 
To derive its optimal pricing, firm i solves the maximization problem 0max ip iπ≥ . 
The corresponding first-order conditions are computed as5 
∂π i
∂pi
=
1
β(1− ε2 ) α i − (1+ γ ti ) 2 pi − (1+ μ i (t − ti ))ci⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − ε(α j − p j (1+ γ t j ))
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0.
From the first-order conditions, we obtain the reaction function ( )i jp p  for 
firm i as 

5 Note that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied because 
∂2π i / ∂pi
2
= −2(1+ t iγ ) / (β (1− ε2)) < 0.  
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pi ( p j ) =
1
2
1+ μ i (t − ti )( )ci + α i − εα j1+ γ ti + ε
1+ γ t j
1+ γ ti
p j
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥ ,  
with , { , }i j E I∈  and i j≠ . Prices are strategic complements, i.e., ∂pi / ∂pj > 0 . 
The effect of t j  on pi  is strictly positive, i.e., an increase of the competitors VAT 
rate will shift the reaction function upwards. However, the effect of ti  is ambigu-
ous and will be analyzed later on.    
Solving the system of reaction functions yields the equilibrium before-tax 
price ip
∗  of firm (operator) i as  
pi
∗
=
1
4− ε2
2 1+ μ i (t − t i )( )ci + ε 1+γ t j1+γ t i 1+ μ j (t − t j )( )c j +
α i (2− ε
2) −α jε
1+γ t i
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥  
 (5) 
with , { , }i j E I∈  and i j≠ . 
It is intuitive that the before-tax price ip
∗
 of firm i  increases with higher 
marginal upstream and downstream costs ci . Similarly, it is straightforward 
that ip
∗
 also increases with higher marginal costs jc  of the competitor j.  
We further derive that a higher tax rate jt  of competitor j induces a higher 
before-tax price ip
∗
 of firm i  if the proportion γ of VAT exempt customers is 
sufficiently large with 1 ( 2 )
j
j jt t
μ
μγ + −> . It should be noted that firm j’s amount of 
input tax (measured byμ j ) plays a crucial role. As γ  is usually significantly larg-
er than zero (see calibration section), the condition will be satisfied if μ j  is suffi-
ciently close to zero (e.g., an operator mainly employing labor directly instead of 
via subcontractors). In such a case, an increase of firm j’s tax jt will degrade its 
competitive position, as non-rated customers face higher prices that cannot be 
compensated for by input tax deductions. Therefore, firm i will be able to increase 
its price profitably.  
On the other hand, a higher own tax rate it  induces a decrease in the be-
fore-tax price ip
∗
 if the ratio of market sizes  α I /α E is larger than  ε / (2 − ε
2 ) be-
cause then the last term in equation (5) is positive and it decreases similar to the 
other terms with a higher tax it . Otherwise, the last term is negative and hence it 
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increases in it  such that the effect of a higher it  on the before-tax price is ambigu-
ous.  
To derive further insights, we analyze two scenarios: in Scenario A, firm I
is VAT exempt, while firm E is VAT rated. In Scenario B, both firms are VAT 
rated.6 
3.3 Scenario A: Firm I is VAT exempt and Firm E is VAT rated 
In Scenario A, we assume that firm I is VAT exempt, that is, 0It = , whereas firm 
E  is VAT rated, that is, t E = t > 0 . Because firm E is rated, it can reclaim the 
VAT it has paid on inputs, while this is not possible for the exempt firm I. 
From Equation (5), we compute the before-tax price AIp of firm (operator) 
I in Scenario A by setting t I = 0  and t E = t .  
pI
A
=
1
4 − ε2
2 1+ μ I t( )cI + ε 1+ γ t( )cE +α I (2 − ε2 ) −α Eε⎡⎣ ⎤⎦.  
Similarly, the before-tax price AEp of firm (operator) E  is computed as  
pE
A
=
1
4 − ε2
2cE + ε
1
1+ γ t
1+ μ I t( )cI + α E (2 − ε
2 ) −α Iε
1+ γ t
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥.  
Substituting equilibrium prices ( , )A AI Ep p  in the demand functions given 
by Equation (3) produces equilibrium demands ( , )A AI Ex x  in Scenario A as 
xI
A
=
(2 − ε2 )(α I − cI (1+ μ I t)) + ε(cE (1+ γ t) −α E )
β(4 − ε2 )(1− ε2 ) ,
xE
A
=
(2 − ε2 )(α E − cE (1+ γ t)) + ε(cI (1+ μ I t) −α I )
β(4 − ε2 )(1− ε2 ) .
The functions illustrate the trade-off that we have discussed: input tax dis-
advantage vs. output tax advantage. With symmetric costs and demands, firm I 
will have a larger market share whenever γ > μ I . It should be noted that the pa-
rameter Iμ  depends on the outsourcing decisions of the firm. Ceteris paribus, 

Note that we introduce the scenario with asymmetric VAT treatment of firms first because this 
scenario represents the status quo in many real-world markets as explained in the introduction.
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being VAT exempt will make it more profitable for the firm to employ workers 
directly than via subcontracting as compared to being VAT rated.  
In the next proposition, we analyze the effect of a higher tax rate t  on 
equilibrium prices and demands in Scenario A. 
Proposition 1  
(i) A higher tax rate t  always yields an increase in the before-tax price AIp of the 
VAT exempt firm I, while the before-tax price AEp  of the VAT rated firm E de-
creases if the market size of firm I is not too large. Formally, 
∂pE
A
∂t
< 0 ⇔α I <
γ −μ I
γ cI +
2−ε2
ε
α E . 
(ii) A higher tax rate t  induces a decrease in the equilibrium demands ( , )A AI Ex x  
of the VAT exempt firm and the VAT rated firm if E
I I
c
c
γ
μ  
is within the interval 
η(ε) = ε
2−ε2
, 2−ε
2
ε( ) . Formally, 
 
∂xI
A (t )
∂t < 0 and 
∂xE
A (t )
∂t < 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⇔
cE
cI
γ
μ I
∈η(ε).  
Proof: See Appendix A.2. 
Part (i) of the proposition shows that the before-tax price of the exempt 
firm I always increases in the tax rate. If the market size of firm I is sufficiently 
small, then the before-tax price of the rated firm E decreases in the tax rate. This 
result can be explained by two effects: (a) because firm I cannot deduct VAT, 
higher taxes will directly lead to higher production costs, and (b) a higher tax rate 
will increase firm I’s output tax advantage as the increased VAT rate is directly 
price relevant for firm E’s non-rated customers. Under reasonable calibration as-
sumptions (i.e., a minimal number of non-rated customers relative to the size of 
Eμ ), firm E will be forced to reduce prices to offset the increase in taxes without 
gaining market shares in return. Marginally, firm I is able to increase prices. 
Therefore, the two effects always have the same direction for the VAT exempt 
firm, whereas they are ambiguous for the VAT rated firm.  
Under reasonable calibration assumptions, both effects will negatively af-
fect demand. Analytically, part (ii) of Proposition 2 explains this result. If the two 
firms offer sufficiently differentiated products or services (i.e., the parameter ε  is 
sufficiently low), then the term (cEγ ) / (cIμ I )  will be in the interval  η(ε)  and 
9
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both types of firms will respond to a higher tax rate by offering lower quantities in 
equilibrium.7 
3.4 Scenario B: Both Firms are VAT rated 
In Scenario B, we assume that firms I and E are VAT rated; that is, 
t I = t E ≡ t > 0 . It follows that both firms can reclaim the VAT they have paid on 
inputs. 
From Equation (5), we compute the before-tax price BIp  of firm (operator) 
I  in Scenario B by setting t I = t E ≡ t : 
2
2
(2 )1 2 .
14
B I E
I I Ep c c t
α ε α ε
ε
γε
⎡ ⎤
− −
= + +⎢ ⎥
+
− ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Similarly, the before-tax price BEp of firm E  is given by  
2
2
(2 )1 2 .
14
B E I
E E Ip c c t
α ε α ε
ε
γε
⎡ ⎤
− −
= + +⎢ ⎥
+
− ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Substituting equilibrium prices ( , )B BI Ep p  in the demand functions given 
by Equation (3) produces equilibrium demands ( , )B BI Ex x  in Scenario B as 
2
2 2
2
2 2
(2 )( (1 )) ( (1 ) )
,
(4 )(1 )
(2 )( (1 )) ( (1 ) )
.
(4 )(1 )
B I I E E
I
B E E I I
E
c t c t
x
c t c t
x
ε α γ ε γ α
β ε ε
ε α γ ε γ α
β ε ε
− − + + + −
=
− −
− − + + + −
=
− −
Except for the cost structure and the market sizes, the two equilibrium de-
mands are now equal and independent of the fraction of VAT rated inputs. There-
fore, this VAT regime does not distort competition between the two firms (opera-
tors); consequently, Scenario B can be seen as the benchmark case for Scenario 
A’s market distortions driven by firm I’s VAT exemption. 
In the next proposition, we analyze the effect of a higher tax rate t  on the 
equilibrium prices and demands in Scenario B. 

7 The interval η(ε )  describes the sufficient conditions under which a higher tax rate induces a 
decrease in equilibrium quantities for both firms. Note that the lower the differentiation parameter 
ε  the larger is the interval η(ε ) . In the limiting case where ε  is zero the interval goes to infinity, 
i.e., limε→0η(ε ) = (0,∞).  
10
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Proposition 2 
(i) A higher tax rate t  yields a decrease in the before-tax prices ( , )B BI Ep p  of firms 
I and E if the ratio of market sizes /I Eα α  is within the interval  η(ε).  Formally, 
∂pI
B (t )
∂t < 0 and 
∂pE
B (t )
∂t < 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⇔
α I
α E
∈η(ε).  
(ii) A higher tax rate t  yields a decrease in the equilibrium demands ( , )
B B
I Ex x  of 
firms I and E if the ratio of cost parameters /I Ec c  is within the interval  η(ε).  
Formally, 
∂xI
B (t )
∂t < 0 and 
∂xE
B (t )
∂t < 0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⇔
cI
cE
∈η(ε).  
Proof: See Appendix A.3. 
A higher VAT tax rate will decrease before-tax prices for both firms in 
Scenario B under reasonable market conditions, i.e., if firms offer reasonably dif-
ferentiated products or services. Even though the fraction of firm I’s non-labor 
inputs Iμ  is no longer relevant, as the firm can now deduct input taxes as well, a 
tax increase will lead to higher prices for the non-rated customer segment. To off-
set some of the resulting volume reductions, the firm will be forced to reduce their 
before-tax prices, ceteris paribus.  
In equilibrium, total demand will decrease for both firms because the in-
crease in VAT introduces a new cost for non-rated customers. Moreover, a higher 
parameter γ  reinforces the negative effect of t on the equilibrium demands for 
both firms. It should be noted that if 0γ = , then the tax rate t has no effect on the 
equilibrium demands. 
Scenario B with symmetric taxation of both firms’ profits is comparable to 
the situation usually studied in the literature on tax incidence. Our findings are in 
line with these analyses. In perfectly competitive industries, commodity taxes 
induce producer prices (before-tax prices) to either fall or remain unchanged. In 
imperfectly competitive markets, taxes may be over-shifted, which results in an 
increase in producer prices due to taxation. Seade (1985) provides criteria for as-
sessing the effects of taxes on prices and profits in Cournot competition. Ander-
son et al (2001) argue that the extent of tax over-shifting depends on the market 
characteristics (see also Stern, 1987): For constant elasticity demand and under 
Bertrand Competition, an ad valorem tax can be either over- or under-shifted. 
With homogeneous products and linear demand, taxes are under-shifted. 
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Kenkel (2005) realized a micro econometric study on alcohol beverages 
based on survey data. He finds that an increase in indirect taxes was over-shifted. 
Baker and Brechling (1992) conducted analyses of tax pass-through for a number 
of consumption products, and they generally find the relation to be one-to-one. 
3.5 Comparison of Scenarios A and B 
Comparing Scenarios A and B, we can establish Proposition 3 which summarizes 
the main results. 
Proposition 3  
(i) The before-tax price of the entrant is lower in Scenario A than in Scenario B if 
and only if the proportion γ  of VAT exempt customers is lower than firm I’s frac-
tion Iμ  of upstream and downstream costs that is non-labor. Formally, 
pE
A < pE
B ⇔γ < μ I . 
(ii) The before-tax price of firm I is higher in Scenario A than in Scenario B if the 
fraction Iμ  of its upstream and downstream costs that is non-labor is sufficiently 
large. Formally, pI
A > pI
B ⇔ μ I > γ
ε(α E − cE (1+ γ t)) − (2 − ε
2 )α I
2cI (1+ γ t)
. 
Proof: See Appendix A.4. 
Part (i) of Proposition 3 shows that the relation between the fraction of 
non-labor upstream and downstream costs of firm I and the proportion of VAT 
exempt customers crucially determines whether the before-tax price of firm E is 
higher in Scenario A or B. We derive that if γ  is smaller than Iμ , firm I’s VAT 
exemption will translate into a disadvantage from firm E’s point of view and force 
firm E to reduce prices, ceteris paribus.8 
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 mirrors the results of Part (i). While firm E will 
be forced to decrease prices, ceteris paribus, firm I will be able to increase its 
price if the fraction Iμ  of its upstream and downstream costs that is non-labor is 
sufficiently large. In this case, VAT exemptions are likely to strengthen the com-
petitive position of firm I. 

8 Note that with regard to postal markets, this is the likely scenario, as incumbents (firm I) often 
have a high percentage of labor costs (i.e., μ I >0.5), whereas the fraction of non-rated customers 
does not usually exceed 50% (i.e., γ ≤ 0.5 ). 
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4 Calibration 
To predict competitive and welfare effects more precisely, we simulate the analyt-
ical model presented in Section 3 by using stylized market data for a selected sec-
tor with asymmetric VAT exemptions. There are various services and sectors with 
asymmetric exemptions such as the postal sector, medical and hospital care, wel-
fare and social security work, university education, certain cultural services and so 
forth. Our model is applicable to all of these sectors. We have chosen the postal 
sector because it provides a prototypical example of such a VAT distortion as we 
have laid out in the introduction. We calibrate the model to reflect the B2C bulk 
mail market because this is the mail segment in which competition is most likely 
to take place in a fully liberalized postal market.9 Firm I represents the incumbent 
operator (universal service provider), whereas firm E is the entrant operator. Sce-
nario A represents the standard situation in the EU postal markets in which only 
the historical (incumbent) operator is VAT exempt, whereas the entrant operator 
has to charge VAT at the standard rate. In Scenario B, both the incumbent and the 
entrant operator are VAT rated. 
To calibrate parameters Iα  and β , we assume that incumbent I as a mo-
nopolistic operator in the market would deliver one billion bulk mail items at an 
average price of 0.35 units of money per item with a point-price elasticity of -0.5. 
It should be noted that the demand function given in Equation (3) is linear, which 
results in the price elasticity decreasing in quantity.      
Parameters iα  influence the size of the market of the two operators’ ser-
vices. By setting I Eα α> , we can include effects such as customer inertia, repu-
tation effects, switching costs, or even quality differences in favor of the incum-
bent (universal service provider). Formally, we define φ  as the percentage of total 
demand the incumbent serves if the entrant offers the very same price for its ser-
vices (“incumbent advantage”). For the calibration, we evaluate demand given in 
Equation (3) with a price of 0.35 for both operators and solve the resulting equa-
tion system. We obtain 
φ = x I
x I +x E
; p I = p E = p = 0.35;   α E =
1
1−ε (1−1/φ ) α I (ε −1+
1
φ) + p (1− ε )(2 −
1
φ)( ).

9 For more calibration details, see Dietl et al. (2005, 2011).  
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In the simulation, we set 0.8φ = ; that is, the entrant would get 20% of the 
market if it were to offer the very same services as the incumbent. A value of 50% 
would mean that customers have symmetric preferences for the two operators.10  
As mentioned, parameter ε measures how different the two products of the 
two operators are; a value close to one would mean that the products are very 
close substitutes. Consistent with previous model calibrations (e.g., Dietl et al. 
2005), we set 0.75ε = . 
The parameter γ  represents the fraction of exempt, non-rated customers 
and varies across mail segments. For the base case, we assume 0.5γ =  to reflect 
the bulk mail market. The value is in line with the current situation, such as the 
German letters market, where DPWN reported a 50% fraction of non-rated cus-
tomers in 2009. 
On the supply side, cost needs to be differentiated in the three dimensions: 
variable/fixed, upstream/downstream and labor/non-labor costs. The latter is rele-
vant for the deduction of input VAT because non-labor costs are VAT rated. In 
the monopolistic calibration benchmark, we assume costs of 250 million units of 
money excluding input taxes. In line with the demand calibration, the cost struc-
ture of the incumbent is calibrated for a hypothetical monopolistic situation. We 
thus assume a reasonable rate of return such that the initial price of 0.35 repre-
sents a rate-of-return regulated monopoly.11   
Table 1 shows the major cost assumptions. With these, we are able to 
compute the necessary parameters to calibrate the two cost functions as intro-
duced in Equation (4). 
We assume that the entrant pursues a different business model with only a 
few delivery days per week, digital pre-sorting and with a lower quality of ser-
vice. On the one hand, this business model leads to both lower fixed and variable 
costs. On the other hand, it induces a higher incumbent advantage φ . The lead 
example of such a business model is the Dutch company Sandd. Similar models 
can be found in other liberalized postal markets. To illustrate the distortive effects 
of VAT with regard to outsourcing, we assume that both players pay equal wage 
rates. In the base case, we assume that the entrant – as observed in practice – ap-
plies a much larger fraction of outsourced labor.12  

10 See Jaag (2007) for a discussion of consumers’ switching behavior in the mail market. 
11 By doing so, we are able to report the results for the monopoly benchmark. Because we are 
mainly interested in competitive effects, we will not report these results. 
We will see below that this different structure can be explained by the different VAT treatments.
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Table 1: Major Cost Assumptions Base Case 
 Incumbent Entrant 
Fraction of fixed costs 50% 20% 
µF (fraction of VAT rated fixed costs) =µI =µE 
µ (fraction of VAT rated variable costs) 30% 70% 
Efficiency premium upstream - 10% 
Efficiency premium downstream  - 30% 
Wage premium - - 
The quasi-linear model framework allows for a computation of overall 
welfare by adding up consumer surplus, operators’ profits and governmental tax 
revenues. The effect of changing postal VAT regimes on governmental tax reve-
nues can be computed as follows. In the case that the USP is exempt, the total 
VAT tax base is the value of the USP’s input goods plus the product value of the 
USP’s customers’ output that is rated. If the USP is rated, the tax base is the value 
of the USP’s output to exempt customers in addition to the product value of the 
USP’s customers’ output that is VAT rated. Whether the difference in the two 
cases is positive thus depends on the USP’s value added and the fraction of rated 
customers. It is positive if the fraction of exempt customers is larger than the in-
verse of the USP’s relative value added. In the next section, we will compute the 
relevant overall welfare measures.  
5 Numerical Results 
The calibrated model allows for some insight into the overall competitive and 
welfare consequences of various tax regimes using the example of the postal sec-
tor. In addition, we perform sensitivity analysis and derive recommendations for 
regulators, market players, and VAT authorities. It should be noted that the quan-
titative results presented in this section serve as rough guidelines only.13  
We report simulation results for the two Scenarios A (incumbent is VAT 
exempt, tI = 0) and B (both operators fully rated at ti = t = 20%). We are interest-
ed in (i) competitive effects measured by market shares, prices, and profits; (ii) 
welfare effects; and (iii) changes in collected VAT. We compute the latter against 
a benchmark scenario where both operators are VAT exempt (tI = tE = 0). 

13 More detailed simulation results are provided in Dietl et al. (2011). 
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5.1 Base Case 
Table 2 reports the results for the base case as introduced in Section 4. The base 
case includes three different VAT scenarios. In Scenario 0, both operators are 
VAT exempt. Scenario A is the standard case in the European postal markets, 
where only the historical (incumbent) operator is VAT exempt. In Scenario B, 
both operators are fully rated. The results that illustrate the competitive effects are 
shown in the upper part of the table, whereas those that show the welfare effects 
are reported in the lower part.   
Table 2: Simulation Results Base Case  (μ I = 0.3,μ E = 0.7)  
The comparison of Scenario A and B illustrates the competitive distortions 
of asymmetric VAT exemptions. In the base case, Scenario A is more favorable 
for the incumbent. Compared to Scenario B in which both operators are fully rat-
ed, the incumbent’s profit increases substantially, whereas the entrant’s profit de-
creases slightly. Both price and profit ratios are substantially higher for the in-
cumbent in Scenario A, meaning that the incumbent can charge higher prices in 
Scenario A in relative terms and earn a higher profit at the same time. Despite its 
16
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higher price level in Scenario A, the incumbent achieves a higher market share. 
The figures show that the tax exemption is distorting competition significantly.14  
Nevertheless, Scenario A exhibits a slightly higher overall welfare level 
than Scenario B.15 There are two opposite welfare effects at work; as a result of 
the incumbent’s VAT rating, the average marginal tax rate in the industry increas-
es. This lowers welfare. However, as the two operators are equally rated, there is a 
level playing field, and competition is more intense, which increases welfare. 
Whereas incremental profits are roughly compensated for by opposite incremental 
tax effects (the profit decrease of the incumbent in Scenario B equals roughly the 
tax increase of the tax authority), customers are slightly better off in Scenario A. 
The positive effect comes from the 50% non-rated customers who face lower net 
prices than they do in Scenario B.16  
The comparison of Scenario 0 and Scenario B illustrates the distortive im-
pact of VAT on the firms’ outsourcing decisions. If both operators are exempt 
from VAT (Scenario 0), there is a strong incentive to use internal workforce be-
cause input VAT on outsourced labor cannot be deducted and hence outsourcing 
is less attractive, ceteris paribus. Consequently, the entrant’s competitive position 
is much stronger in Scenario B, where the input VAT can be deducted. It should 
be noted that the operators’ cost structures are exogenous in both scenarios, re-
sults in a suboptimal labor policy in Scenario 0. The increased costs (because the 
VAT deduction is not possible in Scenario 0) translate into higher incumbent pric-
ing and profits. In practice, operators would be likely to optimize their labor poli-
cy and increase the share of internal workforce in Scenario 0, whereas Scenario B 
will be competitively neutral in this regard. To sum up, abolishing the incum-

14 With the following exception, the results are in line with recent decisions of Deutsche Post DHL 
to reduce its letter prices for business customers significantly in light of the new VAT regime in 
Germany as of July 1, 2010. Deutsche Post announced net price decreases equal to the VAT rate 
itself, which is significantly more than we predict in our simulation.   
15 Our welfare results differ from those reported by De Donder et al. (2009), which yield higher 
welfare in Scenario B. Whereas the authors also report higher consumer surplus in Scenario A, 
they multiply government tax revenues by 1.3 to reflect the shadow cost of public funds and there-
fore find higher overall welfare in Scenario B. As we are interested in the relative effects of the 
postal sector, we weigh all three components of welfare equally and generally do not account for 
second-order effects in other parts of the economy.   
16 Note that this effect stems from the fact that we do not allow for price differentiation between 
customers segments. Therefore, the operators are forced to balance over the two customer seg-
ments yielding lower net prices for the rated customers. While we could extend the model to cap-
ture the relevant effects, regulations in many countries (e.g., Germany) will not allow differentiat-
ed prices for the incumbent.  
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bent’s VAT exemption levels the playing field (in the market itself and in the out-
sourcing market) while it slightly decreases overall welfare in the base case. 
5.2 Effect of Different Cost Structures µI and µE 
Our analytical results presented in Section 3 indicate that the effects crucially de-
pend upon the relative magnitude of the parameters iμ  and γ . Whereas γ  is ex-
ogenously given, the cost structure iμ  can be optimized by the operators. The 
fraction of rated inputs for the entrant, Eμ , is not relevant for the entrant’s deci-
sion making if it is fully rated (i.e., in Scenarios A and B); a higher value of Eμ
indicates larger VAT expenses, which, however, can be fully deducted from the 
VAT billed to the customers. For the tax authority, the net effect matters, as we 
report the difference in a scenario with both operators being exempt. Therefore, a 
higher μE  increases the input tax deduction that the entrant can reclaim. 
In contrast to μE , changes in μ I are of great importance for the market 
equilibrium in Scenario A in which the incumbent is exempt. Here, changes in μ I  
are directly cost relevant; outsourcing to equally efficient partners will increase 
costs by the VAT rate times the amount of the outsourced input goods. In Scenar-
io B, μ I  is irrelevant for the market equilibrium (in analogy to μE  above).  
Table 3 reports the competitive effects of different cost structures.17 Sce-
nario A1 and A2 differ in μ I  but not in μE  (i.e., we obtain the same results for all 
[0,1]Eμ ∈ ). Scenario A1 represents an incumbent that uses employees mainly. 
Scenario A2 indicates an incumbent business model with subcontractors in deliv-
ery. 
Whereas the share of non-rated inputs is generally irrelevant in Scenario 
B, it is of great importance in Scenario A for the operator that is exempt. In con-
trast to the relative prices, the operators’ profits change substantially when com-
paring Scenarios A1 and A2. The incumbent’s VAT exemption is an advantage in 
Scenario A1 and a disadvantage in Scenario A2, where incumbent profits are low-
er. The results are in line with our analytical findings. It should be noted that in 
Scenario A1, μ I < γ , while we have μ I > γ  in Scenario A2. We conclude that 
the net competitive effect of an asymmetric VAT exemption crucially depends on 
the fraction of VAT rated inputs versus the fraction of non-rated customers. In the 

17 Remember that the fraction of VAT exempt (non-rated) customers is set toγ = 0.5 . 
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base case, the latter effect compensates for the former and the exempt incumbent 
has a competitive advantage. 
Table 3: Simulation Results for Different Combinations of µI and µE  
In terms of overall welfare, a higher μ I  decreases welfare in Scenario A, 
as the higher perceived costs of the incumbent reduce its profits and slightly in-
crease average prices in the market (lower consumer surplus). In Scenario B, op-
erator and consumer surplus remain unaffected. Abolishing the incumbent’s VAT 
exemption decreases welfare in Scenario A1 ( μ I < γ ), whereas it increases wel-
fare in Scenario A2 ( μ I > γ ). Therefore, from a public policy point of view, the 
incumbent’s VAT exemption is desirable in a scenario in which the incumbent’s 
fraction of non-labor costs is relatively low. Conversely, if the fraction is relative-
ly high, the VAT exemption reduces welfare because it induces higher prices.18 
In most European countries, incumbent operators do not predominantly 
make use of outsourced labor (i.e., μ I  is relatively low). Therefore, VAT exemp-
tions for bulk mail can be justified from a welfare perspective in countries with a 
substantial fraction of non-rated customers, even though such exemptions distort 
competition clearly in the incumbent’s favor. 

18 Note that this differentiation is not captured in the simulation results reported by De Donder et 
al. (2009). 
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5.3 Effects of Different Combinations of   and µI 
Our analytical results in Section 3 have shown that the competitive effects of 
VAT exemptions are crucially driven by the relative size of γ and μ I . The results 
provided in Table 3 have confirmed the analytics.  
Figure 2 provides a series of 3D-plots to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the competitive effects of the two VAT regimes in Scenarios A 
and B. The 3D-plots depict the operators’ profits in the two-dimensional space 
defined by [0,1]Iμ ∈ and [0,1]γ ∈ , i.e., all feasible combinations of μ I  and γ .
19 
Figures 2-1 and 2-2 depict the profits of the incumbent and entrant for Scenarios 
A and B, respectively. Figure 2-3 illustrates the profits of the two operators in 
Scenario A, while Figure 2-4 displays the differences in the operators’ profits be-
tween Scenario A and the undistorted Scenario B.20  
The figures confirm the analytical findings from Section 3, and they also 
replicate the results presented in Section 5.2 regarding the impact of the operators’ 
cost structure. In addition, they highlight the importance of market segmentation 
and provide a more differentiated view on the competitive effects of VAT exemp-
tions.  
Figure 2-1 illustrates the ambiguous effect of VAT exemptions for non-
rated (incumbent) operators. Such operators will be strengthened in market seg-
ments with a relatively high fraction γ of non-rated customers (e.g., industrial 
customers), whereas they will be worse off in segments with a relatively high 
fraction of rated customers (e.g., banks and private customers). Because exempt 
operators will optimize their capital structure toward a low value of μ I , they are 
likely to be better off in Scenario A and opt for a VAT exemption.  
Figure 2-2 shows the entrant’s perspective. The profits of the VAT rated 
entrants are strictly decreasing in γ  independently of the Scenario. It will prefer 
Scenario B whenever μ I > γ .21 As the incumbent is likely to choose a low value 
of μ I  in Scenario A, the entrant is likely to opt for Scenario B in policy discus-
sions.  

19 Apart from that we use in Figure 2 the same parameter constellations as in Scenarios A and B in 
Section 4.2. 
20 In Figure 2, the operators’ profits appear as planes. Nevertheless, profits are not linear inμ I and 
γ ;  the curvature is only very weak for μ I ∈[0,1] and [0,1]γ ∈ .  
21 Recall p E
A < p E
B ⇔γ < μ I  from Proposition 3(i). 
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Figure 2-4 confirms these findings. It further shows that in the relevant pa-
rameter range (i.e., low μ I ), the competitive advantage of exempt operators in 
non-rated market segments is more important than their disadvantage in rated 
market segments.  
Figure 2: Competitive Effects of Scenario A and B 
As a result, in practice, the competitive effects of VAT exemptions will 
crucially depend on the distribution of customer segments in an industry, which 
vary significantly with γ . Thereby, entrant operators will be able to influence 
(“de-average”) γ  by segmenting the market appropriately. For example, they 
might choose not to enter the market for non-rated banks and insurances and in-
stead focus and tailor their pricing decisions on market segments, in which cus-
tomers are rated (in fact most businesses).  
Profit IA-
IB Profit EA-Profit 
Profit IA
Figure 2-3: Operators’ profits in Scenario A Figure 2-4: Operators’ change in profits
Figure 2-1: Incumbent profits in Scenarios A vs. B Figure 2-2: Entrant profits in Scenarios A vs. B
Profit IB
Profit EB
Profit EA
Profit IA
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6 Conclusion 
Distortions under the value-added tax (VAT) arise partly from the exemption for 
specified services and sectors or from differentiated rates within an industry sec-
tor. The list of these exempt services and sectors include activities undertaken by 
public sector bodies, such as medical and hospital care, welfare and social securi-
ty work, the provision of education and university education and the supply of 
certain cultural services. Furthermore, non-commercial activities carried out by 
public radio and television stations are also exempt from VAT. Another example 
is the postal sector where the universal service providers are usually exempt on 
the grounds that they are the “public postal service”. Other postal service provid-
ers are VAT rated at the standard rate (cf. Trinkner 2009 for a recent overview). 
In this paper, we have developed a general model framework that can be 
applied to any sector in which firms competing in the market face asymmetric 
VAT rates. The model framework enables us to analyze the effects of such 
asymmetric tax regimes on market shares, optimal prices, tax receipts and wel-
fare. The analytical model shows how asymmetric VAT exemptions distort com-
petition by strengthening the competitive position of non-rated firms. The net ef-
fect of such tax exemptions depends on the fraction of rated inputs versus the 
fraction of non-rated customers. We further elucidate the main competitive impact 
of VAT policies while showing the consequences on overall welfare by presenting 
simulation results based on a calibrated quantitative model of the postal sector.  
With a reasonable model calibration, the VAT exemption positively af-
fects profits of exempt operators and degrades profits of rated operators. There-
fore, it strengthens the exempt operators’ relative competitive position and results 
in an unlevel playing field. In the postal sector, this implies that tax exemptions 
for universal service providers may reduce their burden represented by the net 
cost of universal service obligations.22 Our simulation results further show that the 
exemption has a positive effect on consumer surplus. Compared to the scenario 
without VAT exemption, it has a small but positive welfare effect in that the mar-
ginal tax rate is lower on average.  
The different VAT regimes also have an effect on the make-or-buy deci-
sions of operators because VAT exempt operators have a higher incentive to em-
ploy their own workers instead of subcontractors. VAT exemptions thus raise a 

22 Jaag and Trinkner (2011) discuss the effect of market distortions on the calculation of the net 
cost of postal universal service obligations. See Jaag (2010, 2011) for a discussion of the unfair 
burden resulting from universal service obligations in the postal sector. 
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second set of market distortions because they worsen the competitive position of 
external suppliers. 
Our paper may help policy makers assess the main competitive effects of 
VAT policies in sectors that are characterized by asymmetric VAT exemptions. 
Moreover, it can provide guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between 
a level playing field in the market, consumer surplus and government tax revenue. 
Appendix A 
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 
The representative customer maximizes utility u under her/his budget constraint 
y  and thus solves 
max u (x I ,x E ) = m +α I x I −
β
2
x I( )2 +α E x E − β2 x E( )
2
− εβx I x E
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭
s.t. (xI , xE )∈B with B = (xI , xE )∈R+2 | y = m + pI xI (1+γ tI )[ ]+ pE xE (1+γ tE )[ ]{ }.
The Lagrange function is given by 
L(xI , xE ,λ) = u(xI ,xE ) − λ(m + pI xI (1+ γ tI )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + pE xE (1+ γ tE )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − y).  
By computing the first-order conditions of the Lagrange function and solving the 
resulting equation systems, we derive 
xI =
1
β(1− ε2 ) ⎡α I − εα E − pI (1+ γ tI ) + ε pE (1+ γ tE )⎣ ⎤⎦ ,
xE =
1
β(1− ε2 ) ⎡α E − εα I − pE (1+ γ tE ) + ε pI (1+ γ tI )⎣ ⎤⎦.           
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove part (i), we compute the partial derivative of ( )AIp t and ( )
A
Ep t with re-
spect to t  as 
∂p I
A (t )
∂t =
1
4− ε2
⎡2μ Ic I + εγ c E⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0,  
∂p E
A (t )
∂t =
1
4− ε2
(μ I −γ )c I
(1+γ t )2
−γ α E (2− ε
2) −α Iε
(1+γ t )2
⎡
⎣
⎢⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥⎥.
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We further derive 
 
∂pE
A (t )
∂t > 0 ⇔α I > α I
′
≡
γ −μ I
γ cI +
2−ε2
ε
α E .  
To prove part (ii), we compute the partial derivative of ( )AIx t  and ( )
A
Ex t  
with respect to t  and further derive 
∂xI
A(t)
∂t
=
εγ cE − μ I (2 − ε
2 )cI
β(4 − ε2 )(1− ε2 ) < 0 ⇔
cE
cI
γ
μ I
<
2 − ε2
ε
,
∂xE
A(t)
∂t
=
εμ I cI − γ (2 − ε
2 )cE
β(4 − ε2 )(1− ε2 ) < 0 ⇔
cE
cI
γ
μ I
>
ε
2 − ε2
.
          
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 
To prove part (i), we compute the partial derivative of ( )BIp t and ( )
B
Ep t with re-
spect to t and further derive 
2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
( ) (2 )1 0  0,
4 (1 ) 2
( ) (2 )1 20  0.
4 (1 )
B
I I E I
E
B
E E I I
E
p t
t t
p t
t t
α ε α ε α εγ γ
αε γ ε
α ε α ε α εγ γ
α εε γ
⎡ ⎤∂ − −
= − > ⇔ < ∀ >⎢ ⎥∂
− + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤∂ − − −
= − > ⇔ > ∀ >⎢ ⎥∂
− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Note that if 0γ = , then the tax rate t has no effect on the equilibrium prices for 
both firms. 
To prove part (ii), we compute the partial derivative 
of ( )BIx t and ( )
B
Ex t with respect to t and further derive 
2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
( ) ( (2 ) )
0  0,
(4 )(1 ) 2
( ) ( (2 ) ) 20  0.
(4 )(1 )
B
I E I I
E
B
E I E I
E
x t c c c
t c
x t c c c
t c
γ ε ε ε γβ ε ε ε
γ ε ε ε γ
εβ ε ε
∂ − −
= < ⇔ > ∀
∂
− − −
∂ − − −
= < ⇔ < ∀
∂
− −
Note that if 0γ = , then the tax rate t has no effect on the equilibrium demands for 
both firms. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3 
To prove part (i), we compute the difference of firm E's before-tax price in Sce-
narios A and B and derive  
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pE
A
− pE
B
= t
ε(μ I − γ )cI
(4 − ε2 ) 1+ γ t( ) > 0 ⇔ μ I > γ .  
To prove part (ii), we compute the difference of firm I's before-tax price in 
Scenarios A and B as 
pI
A
− pI
B
= t
1+ γ t( )(εγ cE + 2μ I cI ) − γ (α Eε −α I (2 − ε2 ))
(4 − ε2 ) 1+ γ t( ) > 0. 
We further derive 
pI
A > pI
B ⇔ μ I > γ
ε(α E − cE (1+ γ t)) + (2 − ε
2 )α I
2cI (1+ γ t)
.   
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